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In Brief
The Neuroscience Revolution

W

hile the world's attention has
been diverted by the drama of
the Human Genome Project, neuroscience has been quiedy creating a revolution with implications every bit as
profound as those of genetics. Neuroimaging advances, psychopharmaceuticals with enormous potential for clinical use, neural-technological interfaces,
brain stimulation technologies, and organic implants such as fetal cell therapy
are transforming our ability to understand and intervene in the brain. Along
the way, they are also challenging accepted standards for the proper limits of
technology, possibly giving criminal justice some revolutionary and troubling
new tools, redefming our sense of selfhood and brain-body relations, and raising a host of other ethical and social
questions. And all this without a multibillion dollar, public-private juggernaut
like the Human Genome Project to
drive it forward.
Ethicists are only now beginning to
take note of these developments. Two
recent conferences, one on each coast,
have raised a call to ethicists by highlighting the astonishing scientific advances in neurosciences and the ofttimes novel ethical challenges they present.
The first conference, funded by the
Greenwall and Medtronic Foundations
and hosted in February 2000 by the
University of Pennsylvania's Center for
Bioethics and Center for Cognitive
Neuroscience, was the culmination of a
series of meetings of ethicists and neuroscientists in early 2000. A larger, more
ambitious conference took place in San
Francisco in May, sponsored by the
Dana Foundation and hosted jointly by
Stanford and the University of California at San Francisco. Promising to kickstart the "new field of neuroethics," the
conference included leaders in neuro8
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science, law, social science, and ethics—
and William Safire as master of ceremonies. The two conferences explored
issues such as the proper use of psychopharmaceuticals, the proper role of
physicians in dispensing neuroactive
drugs, the nature of human rights and
responsibilities, the proper use of neurodiagnostics (for example, for predicting
a child's susceptibility to a late-onset
disease like Alzheimers), public discourse and social policy, and the proper
nature and limits to the practice of science.
The increasing attention to neuroscience is not surprising given the novel
problems of these technologies. Neuroimaging studies are beginning to
demonstrate an ability to correlate mental states and traits to detectable brain
patterns or structures. Research has
shown, for example, that a history of
depression, or addiction, leaves identifiable brain sequelae even if the disease is
in remission. In some cases, neuroimaging may be able to detect racist ideation,
to diflFerentiate false and true memories,
and to discover mood states (even when
they are preconscious in the subject), intentional prevarication, and even the
content of thought (to discover whether
someone is thinking of a face or a chair,
for example). While these studies are
preliminary and their powers of prediction so far modest, they portend a time
when the criminal justice system, employers, schools, and other institutions
may want to use imaging to detect or refute other kinds of evidence about people's aptitudes, honesty, or history.
In addition to these diagnostic or
scanning technologies, new psychopharmaceuticals are promising to redefine how we conceive of disease, treatment, and professional privilege. Drugs
like Prozac, Viagra, and soon perhaps
modafinil (which fights fatigue without

the side effects of amphetamines), are
being used by people without any diagnosable pathology, and are often prescribed by physicians upon request.
Drugs are being developed that can enhance memory, confidence, and other
aspects of normal functioning and will
likely be as freely available as Viagra,
which can now be purchased on the
web with at best a transparent nod to
diagnostic and prescriptive requirements. As the power and specificity of
these drugs increase, so will the ability
of the average person to manage his
daily life pharmacologically, adding a
host of mood and cognitive enhancers
to the morning cup of coffee and the
after-work cocktail.
Neuroimaging and psychopharmaceuticals are only the tip of the neuroscience iceberg. Implantable computer
"brain chips" are allowing the blind to
see, the deaf to hear, and monkeys to
control cursors on computer screens entirely with their minds. Trans-cranial
magnetic stimulation can temporarily
turn specific areas of the brain off by
sending electric charges through the
skull. Electrode implantation has allowed scientists to create "robo-rats"
whose travels are controlled by the joysticks of scientists, and monkeys whose
thought processes can control mechanical arms thousands of miles away.
Clearly the influence of these technologies on everyday life is only years
away, rather than decades, as in the case
of genetic technologies. Bioethicists are
coming to the game a bit late, and often
underprepared, but the issues are real
and complex, and the neuroscientists
are not waiting for the ethical groundwork to be laid.
—Paul Root Wolpe
University of Pennsylvania
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